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Can ﬁrm names be tradeable assets when changes in name ownership are observable? Earlier
literature suggests that non-observability is critical to sustaining name trading. Yet, casual em-
piricism suggests that shifts in name ownership may be publicly known. This paper shows how
ﬁrm names can be traded even under full observability. In equilibrium, even when consumers see
a reputed name being divested they continue trusting it and so, these names are tradeable. I also
demonstrate an appealing “sorting” property of the equilibria. Competent ﬁrms separate them-
selves by buying valuable names, or incompetent ﬁrms give themselves away by using worthless
names.
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11 Introduction
While describing the recent acquisition of IBM’s ThinkPad name by computer manufacturer Lenovo,
the New York Times wrote:1
When Lenovo, the Chinese personal computer maker, bought I.B.M.’s personal com-
puting business for USD 1.75 billion in December 2004... Lenovo executives assumed
rightly that the I.B.M. brand would still resonate in the United States market and serve
to assuage the worries of existing and prospective customers about the I.B.M. ThinkPad
line of laptops. Lenovo also realized there would be concern among American customers
about buying from a China-based company they had never heard of.
This situation highlights two important phenomena related to ﬁrm reputations.
First, ﬁrms may publicly buy and sell their names like other valuable tradeable assets. As in
the case of Lenovo and ThinkPad, the sale of a well-established name may be public because it is
covered widely by the business press. Changes of ﬁrm ownership may be publicly known because
disclosure is mandated by law. Even when not mandated by law, we see that a new owner may
choose to make it known - haven’t we seen local restaurants announce “Under New Management”?
Second, the market for ﬁrm names can exhibit a sorting property, in the sense that well-
established names are usually bought by good ﬁrms. Consider the example of ‘Waterman’ a famous
premium brand of pens which changed ownership multiple times. Each time the brand was sold,
it was bought by a well-established ﬁrm, once by Gillette in 1992 and more recently by Rubber-
maid. IBM was bought by Lenovo the largest PC manufacturer in China. When Nabisco sold its
well-known ‘Shredded Wheat’ cereal brand, the potential buyers were trusted companies, Kraft and
General Mills. In fact it must be such a sorting property that enables consumers to trust a name
even after they know it has been sold. In the Lenovo example, even after the ThinkPad name was
sold, it appears that consumers continued to trust and buy it. They must have believed that a
ﬁrm capable of buying a name such as ThinkPad was likely to be “good”, and would continue to
provide the same quality of products and services.2
The existing theory on ﬁrm reputations does not explain either of these two phenomena. On
the contrary, the standard models (e.g. Kreps 1990, Tadelis 1999) have two opposite features.
First, non-observability of name trading is a key assumption. The main result in this literature
1See “Quickly Erasing I and B and M” by Glenn Rifkin & Jenna Smith, New York Times, April 12, 2006
2See “Brands Still Easier to Buy than Create” by Kenneth N. Gilpin, New York Times, September 14, 1992.
2is that names are traded in all equilibria, but this result relies critically on the non-observability
assumption which is the source of value for names. Consumers believe that the current owner is
responsible for the good name or record of the ﬁrm, and good past record generates expectation of
good future performance. Good names become tradeable because a ﬁrm can secretly buy a good
name and create expectation of good performance and earn higher revenues.
The second feature of current models is the absence of sorting equilibria. A key result is that the
trading equilibria are all pooling equilibria. It is not possible for good ﬁrms to separate themselves
from the bad ﬁrms by buying valuable names. There are always some bad ﬁrms using valuable
names in equilibrium.
This brings us to the two main questions addressed in this paper. First, can we do away with
the assumption of non-observability and develop a theory to explain why ﬁrm names are valuable
even when clients can observe changes in name ownership? Second, under what conditions and how
can the market for ﬁrm names separate good ﬁrms from bad ones?
I consider an inﬁnite horizon economy with generations of ﬁrms and consumers interacting in
each period. Both ﬁrms and consumers live for only one period. Consumers are homogeneous
and are on the long side of the market. Firms are of two types - competent and incompetent.
Competent ﬁrms can choose to work hard or be lazy. Working hard is costly but likely to result
in good quality products or services. Laziness always results in bad quality. Incompetent ﬁrms are
always lazy and so incapable of producing good quality. Consumers buy a product or service from
the ﬁrm for which they pay upfront. At the time of purchase, consumers do not see the type of the
ﬁrm or the quality of the product. They only see the name of the ﬁrm, and must pay a wage based
on the name.
Firms choose to appear in the market under diﬀerent names which they buy in a competitive
market for names. The basic intuition of the model can be understood using two types of names.
So, for most part of the paper, I focus on this case. Firms can choose to enter with new names (N)
or successful names (S). Entering with an N-name is cheaper than entering with an S-name. After
collecting the wages, competent ﬁrms can choose to work hard or be lazy. At the end of the period,
each ﬁrm’s reputation or name3 changes based on the quality of products it has provided. Names
evolve according to a ﬁxed transition rule (potentially random) which speciﬁes a ﬁrm’s reputation
at the end of the period, based on its original reputation and the quality of products provided.
Before retiring, a ﬁrm can sell its reputation to a new entrant.
3For the rest of the paper, I use “ﬁrm reputation” and “ﬁrm name” interchangeably.
3In this environment, the existence of a market for names aﬀects incentives of ﬁrms in two ways.
First, it inﬂuences the eﬀort choice of the ﬁrm. The continuation payoﬀ from selling a valuable
name can make ﬁrms work hard to produce good quality. Also, the market may give ﬁrms incentives
to buy one name rather than another one. For instance, a ﬁrm may choose to buy a costly name
because consumers pay higher wages for it, or because a costly name is more likely to remain good
and gives a higher continuation payoﬀ.
It is worth noting here why this setting is particularly well-suited to analyze the value of ﬁrm
names when name trading is observable. In a departure from the literature which always considers
overlapping generations of ﬁrms, I consider a model where ﬁrms and consumers are all short-lived.
Therefore it is common knowledge that name ownership changes every period. When a consumer
meets a ﬁrm, she knows that the ﬁrm bought its name before entering.
With full observability of name changes, I examine the existence of equilibria in which the
market for names both causes competent ﬁrms to work hard and sorts ﬁrms according to their
type. I deﬁne a class of equilibria called sorting high-eﬀort equilibria (SHE) where at least one
type of ﬁrm has a strict incentive to not use one of the two names, and competent ﬁrms always
work hard. In the main result of the paper, I characterize necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the existence of such sorting high-eﬀort equilibria (SHE). I show that SHE exist provided the cost
of eﬀort is low enough for competent ﬁrms.
Two kinds of sorting arise in equilibrium. It is possible for competent ﬁrms to separate them-
selves by being the only ones buying the valuable successful names. I call these situations “Trust
S-Names equilibria”. In these equilibria, when consumers see a successful name, they trust it to be
a competent ﬁrm and pay the corresponding high price. The higher wages for an S-name provide
ﬁrms incentives to buy these names. Higher continuation payoﬀs from an S reputation - provided
the same reputation is maintained - give competent ﬁrms the incentive to work hard, and guaran-
tee that incompetent ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it worthwhile to buy these names. Note that there is eﬀort
exertion by competent ﬁrms in equilibrium even though they are sorted out from the incompetent
ﬁrms. In other words, here, unlike in earlier models, moral hazard suﬃces to provide incentives to
exert eﬀort, even in the absence of adverse selection.
The second type of sorting that arises is termed “Mistrust N-Names”. Here, incompetent ﬁrms
give themselves away by being the only ﬁrms using the cheap names. Consumers treat cheap names
with mistrust and pay them corresponding low wages. Competent ﬁrms force this situation to arise
by always buying S-names before entering the market. Note that both types of sorting allow ﬁrms
4to still pool on one name. In “Trust S-Names equilibria”, S-names separate competent ﬁrms from
incompetent ones. But some competent ﬁrms may still pool with incompetent ﬁrms on N-names.
Similarly, in “Mistrust N-Names” equilibria, ﬁrms separate with N-names but may pool on S-
names. In fact it will be shown that, generically, pooling on one name is required for the existence
of high-eﬀort equilibria in this model.
The type of sorting high-eﬀort equilibria that arises depends on the transition rule posited.
I show that for deterministic transition rules, the only type of sorting sustainable in a market
with two names is the “Mistrust N-Names” type. Equilibria with deterministic rules have the
appealing feature that they remain equilibria even in richer information structures, for instance
when consumers observe not just a name but the full history of outcomes of a particular name.
With random transition rules, both types of sorting can arise in equilibrium, as long as the cost of
hard work is low enough. I characterize the transition rules that give rise to each of the two types
of sorting.4
I examine the relationship between observability and separation. It turns out that under ob-
servability, the requirement for separation in equilibrium is not a restrictive one. Relaxing the
requirement for sorting does not extend the range of parameter values under which high-eﬀort
equilibria exist.
Finally in an extension of the model, I study the welfare implications of observability of name
trades. Since I restrict attention to high-eﬀort equilibria, the total surplus of ﬁrms and consumers
is constant across regimes. However, observability does aﬀect consumer and ﬁrm surplus. I present
examples where observability is irrelevant, observability makes consumers better oﬀ and worse oﬀ.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3
presents two simple examples where ﬁrm ownership changes are observable and sorting high-eﬀort
equilibria exist. In Section 4, I consider a market with more general transition rules and characterize
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which sorting high-eﬀort equilibria exist. Section 5
presents an extension which allows us to compare regimes with and without observability. Section 6
discusses the relationship between the results in this paper and those in related literature. Section
7 concludes. Proofs of most results are in the appendix.
4Sorting high-eﬀort equilibria that arise with random transition rules are perhaps less appealing because they fail to
remain equilibria if consumers actually observed the full history of outcomes of a ﬁrm name. However, I conjecture that
a two-state market with random transitions may be equivalently represented by a richer market with more states and
deterministic transitions.
52 The Basic Model
There is a continuum of ﬁrms of unit measure. Firms live for one period only. In each period, they
meet clients who are also short-lived. Consumers are homogeneous and are on the long side of the
market. The following stage game is played by ﬁrms and consumers each period. Assume that the
same play has occurred forever into the past. At the beginning of each period, the ﬁrm enters the
market. At the time of entry, it has to choose a name for itself. After entry, the ﬁrm meets one client
who pays it an upfront wage for its service. All a client sees at the time of purchase is the name
of that particular ﬁrm. So, the wage paid depends only on the observed name. After collecting its
wage, the ﬁrm makes an action choice. It has two choices: work hard (H) or be lazy (L). Being
lazy is costless while working hard involves a cost c > 0. There are two possible outcomes that
can arise from the action chosen - good (G) or bad (B). The probability of a good outcome given
hard work is (1 − ρ) with ρ ∈ (0,1). If the ﬁrm is lazy, a bad outcome occurs with probability 1.
Firms are of two types, competent (C) or incompetent (I). A proportion φ ∈ (0,1) is competent.
A competent ﬁrm can choose to work hard or be lazy. An incompetent ﬁrm is incapable of working
hard. After the ﬁrm takes its action, the outcome occurs, and the ﬁrm’s name changes based on
a pre-determined transition rule. The ﬁrm can sell its (changed) name before retiring. Figure 1
describes the sequence of events in a period.
... ...











Figure 1: Timing of Events within a Period
2.1 The Market for Firm Names
In the market for ﬁrm names, there are two kinds of names, S and N. By convention, I call the
cheaper name N and the more expensive name S. The market for names is competitive and names
trade at prices VS and VN respectively. An entrant can buy (and an exiting ﬁrm can sell) a name of
6its choice from a retiring ﬁrm (to an entrant) at these prices. Without loss of generality, normalize
the price of the cheaper name VN to 0. I also assume that there is no shortage of the cheaper
name. Think of entering with an N-name to be equivalent to entering with no reputation at all.
The market is characterized by a transition rule. Deﬁne a non-random transition rule as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A non-random transition rule is a function f : {S,N} × {G,B} → {S,N}.
A transition rule can be thought of as a device that describes how a name evolves based on the
performance of its owner. As mentioned earlier, at the end of the period, the ﬁrm sells its (now
changed) name if possible, to a new entrant and then retires. In a later section, I generalize the
analysis by allowing random transitions rules, which specify not a deterministic transition but a
distribution over future names based on the original name and the outcome.
The market for names aﬀects the incentives of ﬁrms in two ways. First, it inﬂuences the eﬀort
choice of the competent type. The expected continuation payoﬀ from selling a valuable name can
make competent ﬁrms exert eﬀort, even though they are short-lived. Second, the market may give
ﬁrms incentives to buy one name rather than another. For instance, a ﬁrm may choose to buy a
costly ‘good’ name because consumers pay higher wages for ‘good’ names, or because the transition
rule is such that a ‘good’ name gives a higher continuation payoﬀ.
Notice that changes in name ownership are trivially observable in this setting. When consumers
see a name, they know that the ﬁrm bought this name at the time of entry.
2.2 Payoﬀs
Firms have a discount factor of δ. The net payoﬀ to a ﬁrm consists of the wages it receives plus
the discounted proceeds from selling its name less the price it pays to buy its name, less the cost
of eﬀort. Clients get utility 0 from a bad outcome and utility 1 from a good one. Since clients can
observe only the ﬁrm name and cannot observe the outcome at the time of payment, they pay ﬁrms
wages equal to their expected utility conditional on the observed name, given the ﬁrms’ strategies.
Denote the wages conditional on the name by wS and wN. Since clients make no real decision in
the game, they are not explicitly modeled as players in what follows.
2.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
In this paper, we consider simple Markovian equilibria. An incompetent ﬁrm’s strategy, denoted
by µS, speciﬁes the probability with which it chooses an S-name. A competent ﬁrm’s strategy,
7denoted by (σS,eS,eN), speciﬁes the probability with which it chooses an S-name and a probability
of working hard conditional on each name.
Deﬁnition 2 A steady-state equilibrium consists of strategies of ﬁrms and a price of an S-name,
VS such that
1. The strategies are optimal for the ﬁrms (given the wages), and
2. Demand equals supply in the market for S-names at price VS.
We do not require a market clearing condition for N-names which are in unlimited supply. We
want to ﬁnd equilibria in which the market for names solves the moral hazard problem and sorts
competent and incompetent ﬁrms. So we deﬁne a sorting high eﬀort equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 A sorting high-eﬀort equilibrium (SHE) is a steady-state equilibrium in which
1. There exists at least one name that is chosen by one type of ﬁrm and not by the other,
2. Each ﬁrm strictly prefers a name it chooses to one that it does not choose,
3. Competent ﬁrms strictly prefer to work hard on the equilibrium path.
This deﬁnition requires partial sorting. It turns out that the set of parameters for which SHE exist
with full sorting is non-generic.
In this model, we cannot apply the standard repeated game arguments to derive the values of
names that can sustain high eﬀort. Here, the continuation payoﬀ or the values of names cannot be
chosen arbitrarily but must satisfy the market clearing conditions in the market for names.
3 Example of SHE
In this section, I discuss two examples of sorting high-eﬀort equilibria. These examples demonstrate
diﬀerent reputational eﬀects. In the ﬁrst, incompetent ﬁrms give themselves away by being the only
ﬁrms entering with cheap N-names. I call these SHE “Mistrust Cheap Names” or “Mistrust N-
Names” equilibria.
Deﬁnition 4 A “Mistrust N-Names” or “Mistrust Cheap Names” equilibrium is a SHE where the
incompetent type is the only one using cheap N-names. (S-names are used by both types)
In these equilibria, S-names are used by both kinds of ﬁrms. So incompetent ﬁrms are actually
indiﬀerent between N and S-names. On the other hand, competent ﬁrms who can work hard can
8get a better continuation payoﬀ with an S-name, and so strictly prefer to use S-names. As a result,
clients treat cheap names with mistrust and pay low (zero) wages to a ﬁrm with a cheap name.
I show that in a market with two names and non-random transition rules, this is the only kind
of sorting that can be sustained. In the second example, I present a “Trust Expensive Names”
equilibrium, where only copetent ﬁrms buy expensive names.
Deﬁnition 5 A “Trust S-Names” or “Trust Expensive Names” equilibrium is a SHE where the
competent type is the only one using the valuable S-names. (N-names are used by both types)
To demonstrate this eﬀect, we consider a market with three kinds of ﬁrm names. (These equilibria
do not exist with only two names.) There is an expensive name that only competent ﬁrms buy. The
other names are used by both types of ﬁrms. In equilibrium, clients know this and when they see
this expensive name, they pay the highest possible wages. Since incompetent ﬁrms are not capable
of getting good outcomes, they do not ﬁnd it worthwhile to pay the high price of the expensive
name.
3.1 “Mistrust Cheap Names” Equilibria: An Example
Consider the transition rules represented by the two automata in Figure 2. We will see that
with these transition rules, “Mistrust Cheap Names” equilibria can be sustained. In equilibrium,










Figure 2: Transitions for “Mistrust Cheap Names” equilibria
To see why, observe that under both these rules, conditional on a bad outcome N-names have
strictly better continuation payoﬀs than S-names. So, I-ﬁrms are willing to pay for S-names, a price
VS which is the diﬀerence between the increase in wages from using an S-name and the decrease in
the continuation payoﬀ from using it. At this price, C-ﬁrms choose to buy S-names and work hard.
9Though they can be lazy, use N-names and still earn a higher continuation payoﬀ, they choose not
to do so, as the increase in continuation payoﬀs from using an N-name does not compensate for
the decrease in wages that they suﬀer from using it.
So, competent ﬁrms signal their competence by buying S-names and then work hard to get a
high continuation payoﬀ. Incompetent ﬁrms either use a costless name and get a high continuation
payoﬀ, or they impersonate competent ﬁrms and earn high wages but lose out on continuation
payoﬀ. Proposition 1 formalizes this intuition.
Lemma 1 SHE must have C types using only S-names.
This observation enables us to prove that the above example is the only SHE sustainable with
non-random transition rules and two names. To prove the lemma, I introduce some notation. Any


























First consider equilibria in which C-ﬁrms use both S and N-names. For C-ﬁrm to be indiﬀerent
between the two names, the following must be true:
−VS + wS − c + δ(1 − ρ)f1VS + δρf2VS = wN − c + δ(1 − ρ)f3VS + δρf4VS (1)
For the C-type to prefer working hard to being lazy on the equilibrium path, we need
c < δ(1 − ρ)(f1 − f2)VS and c < δ(1 − ρ)(f3 − f4)VS. (2)
For (2) to hold, both S and N-names must transition to an S-name after a good outcome and to
an N-name after a bad one. (i.e. f1 = 1, f2 = 0, f3 = 1 and f4 = 0). But by (1), this implies
VS = wS − wN. (3)
A sorting equilibrium requires that I-ﬁrms play S or N but not both. So, one of the following must
be true:
−VS + wS + δf2VS < (>)wN + δf4VS.
10Since f2 = f4 = 0, this implies that VS > (<)wS − wN, contradicting (3). Next, consider sorting
equilibria in which the C-type uses only N-names. Then, the I-type must use S-names. So the
following must be true:
VS ≤ wS − wN + δVS(f2 − f4)
But, in this equilibrium, wS = 0 ≤ wN. This implies that VS ≤ 0, which is not possible. If VS ≤ 0,
this would destroy incentives for C-ﬁrms to work hard in any state. This concludes the proof.
The intuition for the second part is that since only I-types buy S-names, there is no beneﬁt
in wages from an S-name. I-types buy S-names only because an S-name gives a better (weakly)
continuation payoﬀ than an N-name in case of a bad outcome. Therefore, at best an I-ﬁrm gets a
continuation payoﬀ of δVS, but must pay VS for it. This will leave the I-ﬁrm with a non-positive
net payoﬀ. So it cannot be that incompetent ﬁrms buy S-names. This contradicts the hypothesis.
So, in equilibrium C-types can play only S-names.







(1 + δ)(1 + φ − φρ)
.
The equilibria can be characterized as follows:
1. Competent ﬁrms buy only S-names.




3. Firms earn wages that equal the expected utility to the consumer conditional on the ﬁrm’s name,
wS =
φ(1−ρ)
φ+(1−φ)µS and wN = 0.
4. S-names trade at price VS = wS
1+δ.
The interested reader may refer to the appendix for the proof of Proposition 1. Notice that if the
proportion of competent types is very high (i.e. for φ > 1
1+ρ), there will be a shortage of S-names
in the market. There will be a high demand for S-names but there will be insuﬃcient incompetent
ﬁrms creating S-names. So the market for S-names cannot clear.
When φ < 1
1+ρ, the equilibria characterized above are partially sorting equilibria in that S-names
are bought by both types of ﬁrms, but only incompetent ﬁrms use N-names. At the knife-edge case
φ = 1
1+ρ, full separation can be sustained, where C-ﬁrms use S-names and I-ﬁrms use N-names.
An important feature of this equilibrium is that it remains an equilibrium even if consumers
could observe not only the name of the ﬁrm but also the complete history of outcomes of the
name. This is an appealing property because it implies that the existence of the SHE above is not
11dependent on the implementation of any speciﬁc transition rule. (Refer to Section 4.4.1 for further
discussion of this property.)
3.2 “Trust Expensive Names” Equilibria: An Example
Proposition 1 establishes that the only SHE that exist with two names and non-random transition
rules are of the “Mistrust Cheap Names” type. The next example therefore uses a richer market
with three possible ﬁrm names to demonstrate “Trust Expensive Names” equilibria under non-
random transition rules. There is a valuable ﬁrm name that is bought only by competent ﬁrms.
The other names are bought by both types of ﬁrms. Competent ﬁrms work hard in equilibrium.
3.2.1 A Richer Market for Names
Consider a richer market for names with three names: S1, S2 and S3. Without loss of generality, let
S3 be the cheapest name with its price normalized to 0. Denote the wages conditional on the name
by w1, w2 and w3. I restrict attention again to non-random transition rules which are functions
f : {S1,S2,S3} × {G,B} → {S1,S2,S3}. An incompetent ﬁrm’s strategy, denoted by (µ1,µ2,µ3),
speciﬁes the probability with which it chooses S1, S2 and S3-names respectively. A competent
ﬁrm’s strategy, denoted by (σ1,σ2,σ3,e1,e2,e3), speciﬁes the probabilities with which it chooses
S1, S2 and S3-names respectively, and the probability of working hard conditional on each name.
The deﬁnitions of equilibrium and sorting high-eﬀort equilibrium can be extended to this richer
environment in a natural way.
Deﬁnition 6 A steady state equilibrium for a given transition rule consists of strategies of ﬁrms
and prices of names V1 and V2 such that
1. The strategies are optimal for the ﬁrm (given the transition rule and the wages), and
2. Demand equals supply in the markets for S1 and S2-names at prices V1 and V2 respectively.
Deﬁnition 7 A sorting high-eﬀort equilibrium (SHE) is a steady-state equilibrium in which
1. There exists at least one name that is chosen by one type of ﬁrm and not by the other,
2. Each ﬁrm strictly prefers the names it chooses to those it does not choose, and
3. Competent ﬁrms choose to work hard on the equilibrium path.
Note that I assume that ﬁrms work hard on and oﬀ the equilibrium path. This is just a convenient
assumption. If this restriction were dropped, SHE would exist for a larger set of parameters.
12We can extend the deﬁnition of “Trust Expensive Names” equilibria in a similar way.
Deﬁnition 8 A “Trust Expensive Names” equilibrium is a SHE in which there is some valuable
name that is bought only by competent ﬁrms. (The other names may be bought by both types.)
3.2.2 Example









Figure 3: Transition for “Trust Expensive Names” Equilibria
We show that with these transition rules, “Trust Expensive Names” equilibria exist. In these
equilibria, competent ﬁrms are the only ones buying S1-names. S2 and S3-names are bought by
both types. Competent ﬁrms work hard irrespective of the name they enter with. There are
other transition rules which also give rise to SHE. Refer to the appendix for a description of all
SHE sustainable under non-random transition rules in this richer market with three names. The
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for such an equilibrium are as follows:
Incentive Compatibility for Name Choice
Competent ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between S1 and S3-names.
−V1 + w1 − c + δ(1 − ρ)V1 = w3 − c + δ(1 − ρ)V2 + δρV1 =⇒ V1 =
w1 − w3 − δ(1 − ρ)V2
1 + δρ − δ(1 − ρ)
(4)
Competent ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between S2 and S3-names.
−V2 + w2 − c + δ(1 − ρ)V2 + δρV1 = w3 − c + δ(1 − ρ)V2 + δρV1 =⇒ V2 = w2 − w3 (5)
Incompetent ﬁrms must strictly prefer an S3-name to an S1-name.




13Incompetent ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between S3 and S2-names.
w3 + δV1 = −V2 + w2 + δV1 =⇒ V2 = w2 − w3 (7)
Incentive for Competent Firms to Work Hard
Competent ﬁrms prefer working hard to being lazy irrespective of the name they enter with.
c < δ(1 − ρ)V1 and c < δ(1 − ρ)(V2 − V1) (8)
Market Clearing Conditions
S1 names: φσ1 = φσ1(1 − ρ) + φσ2ρ + φ(1 − σ1 − σ2)ρ + (1 − φ)µ2 + (1 − φ)(1 − µ2)
=⇒ σ1 =
1 − φ + φρ
2φρ
(9)











Wages w1,w2,w3 just equal the expected utility to the consumer. It can be easily veriﬁed that
the above equations and inequalities admit a non-empty solution set.
There are two interesting features of this example. First notice that when a consumer sees an
S1-name, she knows with certainty that the ﬁrm is a competent one. There is no uncertainty about
the type, and yet competent ﬁrms still choose to work hard. This is contrary to standard reputation
models in which it is the uncertainty about a player’s type that forces eﬀort exertion.
Second, notice that a richer market for names can extend the range of equilibria. From (9), we
see that for σ1 to lie in the interval (0,1), we need 1−φ+φρ < 2φρ. In other words, the equilibrium
conditions in this example imply that φ > 1
1+ρ. But these are precisely the conditions for which
equilibria do not exist in the ﬁrst example in a market with two names. So there exist SHE in the
richer market with non-random transition rules which are not possible in the two-state market.
4 Markets with General Transition Rules
With two states and non-random transition rules our ability to sustain SHE seems limited. It is
not possible to sustain “Trust S-Names” equilibria. Further, even if the cost of working hard is
very small, it is not possible to sustain SHE if there are too many competent ﬁrms (high φ) or if
the chance of failing (ρ) is high. Section 3.2 suggests one way of sustaining more SHE: by enriching
the market with more states.
14An alternate approach could be to consider more general transition rules. Why might this
approach work? The following example illustrates why. With a non-random transition rule, the
original name and outcome together determine with certainty the future name of the ﬁrm. Suppose
now that N-names were ‘disadvantaged’ in the sense that even after a good outcome N-names
found it harder to become S-names. (Formally, conditional on a good outcome the future of a ﬁrm
with an N-name is determined by the realization on an independent idiosyncratic randomization
device. With a strictly positive probability, N-names remain worthless even after a good outcome.)
S-names do not suﬀer this disadvantage, i.e. conditional on a good outcome, an S-name remains
an S-name with certainty. Conditional on a bad outcome, any name becomes worthless. If such a
transition rule were prevalent, a competent ﬁrm would be willing to pay a strictly higher premium
for S-names compared to an incompetent ﬁrm. An incompetent ﬁrm is willing to pay a price up
to the increase in wages it gets from an S-name. A competent ﬁrm is willing to pay this and
more. A C-ﬁrm is also willing to pay for the increase in expected continuation payoﬀs from an
S-name (conditional on working hard). This would be enough to yield “Trust S-Names” equilibria,
as sorting only requires that one type be willing to pay a strictly higher premium for an S-name
than the other type.
This idea leads us to ask: If we use more general transition rules, what are the conditions
under which SHE can be sustained without further enriching the market for names? This section
addresses this question. I conjecture that a two-state market with random transitions is only an
eﬃcient way of representing a richer market with deterministic transitions. In other words, for
any SHE with random transitions in the two-state market, it is possible to ﬁnd a deterministic
transition rule that can sustain an equivalent SHE in a market endowed with more names.
Deﬁnition 9 Deﬁne a general transition rule to be a function f : {S,N} × {G,B} → ∆({S,N}),
where ∆({S,N}) represents the probability distributions over the states {S,N}. So, a general
transition rule f can be described completely by a vector (γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4), where
f(S,G) = (γ1,1−γ1) f(S,B) = (γ2,1−γ2) f(N,G) = (γ3,1−γ3) f(N,B) = (γ4,1−γ4)
Here, f(S,G) = (γ,1 − γ) denotes that conditional on outcome G, an S-name will transition to S
with probability γ and to N with probability 1 − γ.
Notions of strategies and equilibrium are unaltered. We start with the following observation.
Lemma 2 In any SHE, some competent ﬁrms must buy S-names.
15Proof: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which competent ﬁrms buy only N-names (the cheap
name). Sorting implies that incompetent ﬁrms must use the valuable S-names. In other words, an
I-type prefers (at least weakly) an S-name to an N-name.
−VS + wS + δγ2VS ≥ wN + δγ4VS (11)
Since in such an equilibrium, wS < wN, the above expression would imply that VS is negative
irrespective of the values of γ2 and γ4. This is a contradiction as VS is the valuable name. 2
To see the intuition, consider the incentives for incompetent ﬁrms. A name aﬀects incentives
via wages or via continuation payoﬀs. In an equilibrium in which C-ﬁrms buy only N-names, an
S-name would always give lower wages than an N-name. So the only reason for an incompetent
type to buy an S-name is that it gives higher continuation payoﬀs than an N-name, after accounting
for the price paid for the S-name. At best, an S-name will give a discounted continuation payoﬀ
of δVS, which means that net payoﬀ from an S-name is really negative. At worst, an N-name will
give a net payoﬀ of 0. So, it cannot be that incompetent ﬁrms prefer buying S-names to N-names.
4.1 Characterizing the Region where SHE Exist
By the lemma above, C-ﬁrms must buy S-names and I-ﬁrms must buy N-names in SHE. This
leaves us with only two possible kinds of sorting. These are in fact the types of sorting we observed
in the examples in Section 3.
The ﬁrst is “Trust S-names” sorting. Here, only competent ﬁrms buy successful names. C-ﬁrms
use both N and S-names. I-ﬁrms use only N-names. So, competent ﬁrms signal their competence
by buying S-names, and incompetent cannot impersonate competent ﬁrms by buying S-names
because the price is too high to make it worthwhile. Consumers trust an S-name when they see it,
because they are certain that it is owned by a competent ﬁrm.
The second type of sorting is “Mistrust N-names”. Here, only incompetent ﬁrms enter with new
names. S-names are used by both C and I-ﬁrms. Competent ﬁrms do not use N-names because
if they work hard, the costly S-names still give them a higher expected payoﬀ than N-names.
Consumers mistrust any N-name, because they are certain that it is owned by an incompetent
ﬁrm.
Recall that our objective is to characterize the conditions under which it is possible to ﬁnd
transition rules which result in sorting high-eﬀort equilibria. It turns out that there is a simple
characterization of the conditions for existence. SHE exist if and only if the cost of eﬀort is low
16enough.
Proposition 2 Given φ,ρ,δ,c, a sorting high-eﬀort equilibrium exists if and only if
c < ¯ c = min
 
δ(1 − φ)(1 − ρ)2
1 − φ + δφρ
,
δ(1 − φ)(1 − ρ)2
δ(1 − φ) + φρ
 
The interested reader may refer to the appendix for the proof. Note that the upper bound ¯ c is
decreasing in φ. In other words, as the proportion of competent ﬁrms increases, it becomes harder
to maintain a high-eﬀort sorting equilibrium. To see why, notice ﬁrst that if almost all ﬁrms are
competent, (as φ → 1) the consumer will pay very similar wages to ﬁrms with S and N-names (i.e.
(wS − wN) → 0). In all sorting equilibria, we have seen that the price of an S-name is always less
than or equal to the diﬀerence in wages. As a result, the price of an S-name will approach zero as
well. If there is no beneﬁt from ending up with an S-name, the incentives for working hard will be
lost.
The upper bound ¯ c is also decreasing in ρ. The intuition is straightforward. If the probability
of a bad outcome conditional on working hard is reduced, competent ﬁrms have a better incentive
to work hard. At the other extreme, if hard work resulted in a bad outcome for sure (ρ = 1), there
would be no incentive to work hard, and a high-eﬀort equilibrium would be impossible. Indeed, at
ρ = 1, c needs to be negative.
Given any cost of eﬀort c < ¯ c, one may ask whether both types of SHE exist for this cost. It
turns out that the conditions for existence of “Trust S-Names” equilibria alone are more restric-
tive. “Trust S-Names” equilibria exist if and only if the cost of eﬀort is lower than a threshold
δ(1−φ)(1−ρ)
2
1−φ+φρ . Notice that for impatient ﬁrms, this threshold is strictly smaller than ¯ c. Hence, above
this threshold cost, the only SHE that exist are of the “Mistrust N-Names” type. For perfectly
patient ﬁrms, the thresholds are the same, and hence both types of SHE exist for any cost c < ¯ c.
4.1.1 HE and SHE
As an aside, let us examine the relationship between observability and sorting. The sorting feature
of equilibrium arises naturally in a model with observability of name trades. The rough intuition
is as follows: For names to be valuable, consumers must be able to trust a good name even when
they know that it has just been sold to a new owner. This is possible if one of two situations arise:
Consumers may be sure that only competent ﬁrms can buy good names. Alternatively, consumers
must believe that new names cannot be trusted, as only incompetent ﬁrms choose to enter with
new names. Successful names are valuable (tradeable) if some form of sorting arises in equilibrium.
17It turns out that under observability, sorting does not restrict the range of parameters where
high-eﬀort equilibria exist. Deﬁne high-eﬀort equilibrium with no sorting as follows:
Deﬁnition 10 (High-eﬀort Equilibrium) A high-eﬀort equilibrium without sorting (HE) is a
steady-state equilibrium in which
1. There is no name that is chosen by one type of ﬁrm and not by the other, and
2. Competent ﬁrms strictly prefer to work hard on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 3 Given φ,ρ,δ,c, a high-eﬀort equilibrium (HE) exists if and only if
c <
δ(1 − φ)(1 − ρ)2
1 − φ + φρ
This proposition is proved using identical methods as Proposition 2, and so the proof is omitted.
Notice that the upper bound for costs is lower in the case of HE. This implies that the requirement
for separation in equilibrium is not a restrictive one. By relaxing the requirement of sorting, we
cannot expand the range of parameter values where high-eﬀort equilibria exist. In a sense, in
high-eﬀort equilibria under observability, we get the sorting feature for free.
Below we return to analyzing the SHE. The next two propositions characterize each type of
sorting that arises in terms of the transition rule, costs and primitives of the environment.
4.2 Trust S-Names Equilibria
What kind of transition rules can create “Trust S-names” equilibria? Intuitively, transition rules
must display three properties:
1. For C-ﬁrms to be indiﬀerent between S and N-names, the price of an S-name must be exactly
equal to the sum of increase in wages and increase in expected continuation payoﬀs conditional
on working hard. For I-ﬁrms to avoid S-names, the price must be higher than the increase
in wages and the increase in continuation payoﬀs conditional on a bad outcome.
2. Transition rules must be such that the demand for S-names equal the supply.
3. For C-ﬁrms to have a strict incentive to work hard in every state, transitions must ensure
that the expected payoﬀ from working hard is strictly higher than that from being lazy.
The following proposition describes these properties formally.
18Proposition 4 (Trust S-Names Equilibria) High-eﬀort “Trust S-names” equilibria exist if and
only if
1. γ3 − γ4 < γ1 − γ2
2. γ4 <
φ
1−φ(1 − (1 − ρ)γ1 − ργ2)






So, for a given distribution of ﬁrms φ, success rate (1−ρ) and discount factor δ, transition rules
which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) can sustain high-eﬀort “Trust S-names” equilibria, provided
the cost of working hard is suﬃciently low (i.e. (3) holds). For the proof, the reader may refer to
the appendix. We get an analogous result for “Mistrust N-names” equilibria.
4.3 Mistrust N-Names Equilibria
In “Mistrust N-Names” equilibria, what must transition rules look like?
1. For incompetent ﬁrms to use S and N-names, the price of an S-name must be exactly equal to
the increase in wages and increase in the continuation payoﬀs conditional on a bad outcome.
For C-ﬁrms to not use N-names, the price of an S-name must be less than the total increase
in wages and continuation payoﬀ conditional on hard work.
2. The market for S-names must clear.
3. C-ﬁrms must work hard on the equilibrium path i.e. when they buy S-names.
Proposition 5 (“Mistrust N-Names” Equilibria) High-eﬀort “Mistrust N-names” equilibria
exist if and only if





1−φ(1 − (1 − ρ)γ1 − ργ2)






For a proof of the Proposition 5, the reader may refer to the appendix. The conditions for the
existence of “Mistrust N-Names” equilibria turn out to be more permissive than those for “Trust S-
Names”. In “Mistrust N-Names” equilibria competent ﬁrms use only S-names. Since N-names are
oﬀ the equilibrium path for C-ﬁrms, and it is no longer necessary to sustain high-eﬀort conditional
19on an N-name. This makes it possible to sustain high-eﬀort and sorting for some parameter ranges
where “Trust S-Names” are unsustainable.
4.4 Non-Random Transitions as a Special Case
It can be easily veriﬁed that the example of SHE with non-random transition rules described in
Section 3.1 satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 5. From Propositions 4 & 5, it can be seen why
these are the only non-random rules that work. Consider all possible non-random transition rules
in the two-state market. To maintain incentives for competent ﬁrms to work hard, all rules which
do not reward an S name for a good outcome are eliminated. (i.e. rules with γ1 ≤ γ2). This leaves
possible only four transition rules.
(1,0,1,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,1,1) (1,0,0,1)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Rule (a) violates Condition 1 for both types of equilibria and cannot ensure sorting. Rule (b)
destroys incentives for hard work in both types of equilibria. Rules (c) and (d) destroy eﬀort
incentives in the “Trust S-names” case. This leaves only rules (c) and (d) as options to sustain
“Mistrust N-names” equilibria, which are precisely the ones described in Section 3.1.
4.4.1 Equilibrium when Clients Observe Full History of Outcomes
The SHE with non-random transitions satisfy another interesting property. These equilibria survive
in the more standard inﬁnitely repeated game setting where consumers can see not just the name
but the full history of outcomes for any ﬁrm name that they encounter.
To elaborate, let us consider a slightly diﬀerent environment, where a name is a complete
history of outcomes (G or B) of the ﬁrms that owned it. So, when consumers see a name what
they observe is the complete history of outcomes. Note that since play has occurred for ever into
the past, consumers observe an inﬁnite history of outcomes. The timing of the game is unaltered.
As before, ﬁrms must choose a name before they enter. Retiring ﬁrms sell their name if possible.
A new ﬁrm can choose to enter costlessly with a new name (with no history) N or with a name
bought from a retiring ﬁrm. In this setting, we want to look for sorting high-eﬀort equilibria. In
other words, can we ﬁnd equilibria where competent ﬁrms always exert high eﬀort, and there is at
least one kind of name which perfectly signals the type of the ﬁrm that uses it?
20In this setting, since names are now just histories, ﬁrms can choose between potentially inﬁnitely
many diﬀerent names. On the face of it, this would complicate the problem signiﬁcantly. We
can simplify the problem by considering certain equivalence classes of outcome histories. Denote
the entire set of possible outcome histories by H and any arbitrary history by h. Consider two
equivalence classes of H , denoted by N and S, deﬁned as follows:
Let N ∈ N
h ∈ S =⇒ hB ∈ N ,hG ∈ S
h ∈ N =⇒ hB,hG ∈ S
To illustrate, the history NGB belongs to N while NGBB belongs to S.
Clients will treat any two histories in the same equivalence class in the same way. In eﬀect,
clients behave as if ﬁrms appear under two names N and S. It can be easily veriﬁed that the
following constitutes a steady-state equilibrium in this game.
- N -names are worthless. S-names sell at a price VS as in Proposition 1.
- C-ﬁrms always enter with S-names.
- I-ﬁrms use S-names with probability µS as in Proposition 1 and N -names with 1 − µS.
When a consumer sees a name from N , she believes that the ﬁrm must be an incompetent one
and so pays a wage of wN = 0. When she sees a name from S, she knows the ﬁrm could be a C
or an I-ﬁrm, and pays her expected utility wS as given in Proposition 1.
So, we have found an exact analog of the “Mistrust N-names” equilibrium derived in the econ-
omy with two kinds of names and non-random transition rules. Why is this a desirable property? In
our model, a transition rule is a mechanism (conceivably managed by a mediator) that determines
the future of a ﬁrm based on its original name, realized outcome and an independent idiosyncratic
randomization. SHE that arise seem to depend critically on implementation of the transition rule.
However, we see here that the SHE that are sustainable with non-random transitions are not really
dependent on the existence of any mediator or transition mechanism. They can arise naturally in
equilibrium in a standard repeated game environment where all players can observe the history of
realized outcomes. This property does not hold for SHE under random transitions. However, I
conjecture that for any SHE in the two-state market with random transitions, an equivalent one
can be derived using non-random rules in a market with a richer set of names. In that case, we
would be able to use a richer set of equivalence classes of histories and remove the dependence of
SHE on speciﬁc transition rules.
215 Relaxing Observability
So far, we have considered an environment where name trades are fully observable, and derived
sorting high-eﬀort equilibria. An interesting extension would be a comparison of this environment
with one with non-observability of name ownership changes, in terms of existence of SHE and
welfare implications. A detailed examination of these issues is not included in the scope of this
paper. In this section, I present some examples to illustrate how the welfare comparisons can go
in either direction, based on the speciﬁc transitions rules being implemented and the primitives
of the environment. In the model described so far, observability is automatic. In order to make
a meaningful comparison between regimes with and without observability, we need to alter the
environment.
5.1 Overlapping Generations Model
Consider an economy with overlapping generations of ﬁrms. As before there are two types of ﬁrms,
competent and incompetent. A proportion φ is competent. Competent ﬁrms can choose to work
hard and incompetent ﬁrms are incapable of working hard. There are two outcomes - good (G) and
bad(B). Conditional on hard work, the probability of a good outcome is (1 − ρ), and conditional
on laziness, a good outcome never occurs.
Each ﬁrm lives two periods. Firms can enter with N or S-names. Firms meet consumers once in
each period. Retiring ﬁrms sell their name before retiring. Consider the general random transition
rules described in Section 4. Conditional on a good outcome, an S-name remains an S-name with
probability γ1 and N-names become S with probability γ2. Conditional on a bad outcome, S-names
remain S-names with probability γ3 and N-names become S-names with probability γ4. The timing
of the game is depicted in Figure 4.
In any period there are three generations of ﬁrms - nascent ﬁrms who are just entering the
market, old ﬁrms who have already lived for one period and retiring ones. Only retiring ﬁrms
can sell names to nascent ﬁrms. Old ﬁrms cannot buy or sell names. (This is just a convenient
assumption. The qualitative results are unaltered if old ﬁrms also bought names.)
At the time of entry, a ﬁrm decides what name to enter with. It can enter costlessly with
a neutral (N) name, or can buy a costly name from a retiring ﬁrm. On entering, ﬁrms meet a
consumer who pays the ﬁrm an upfront wage. Then the ﬁrm takes an action (work hard or be



















Figure 4: Timing of Game for Overlapping Generations of Firms
a consumer again in the second period now with his altered name. Again, he collects his wage,
takes an action, and his name changes. Before retiring the ﬁrm sells its name (if possible) to a
nascent ﬁrm. For simplicity, we ignore discounting.
Consumers live only one period. They pay ﬁrms upfront, and so pay the expected utility based
on what they observe. In this model, we can study the two regimes with and without observability
of name ownership. In a regime of non-observability, consumers see only the name of the ﬁrm.
Under observability, they see not just the name but also the age of the ﬁrm. The age of a nascent
ﬁrm is 0 and the age of an old ﬁrm is 1. This is equivalent to full observability of name: for
instance, a nascent S-name must be a ﬁrm which just bought the name. Denote the wages by
wN,0,wN,1,wS,0,wS,1, where wa,i denotes the wage paid to a ﬁrm with name a and age i. Notions
of strategies and equilibrium are extended in the natural way.
5.2 Observability and Welfare: Examples
When we compare regimes of observability and non-observability, it is clear that since we consider
only high-eﬀort equilibria the total surplus of consumers and ﬁrms is constant. The more interesting
question is to ask separately whether the consumers are better oﬀ under any particular regime.
Alternatively, which ﬁrms fare better under which regimes?
While a general analysis is postponed to later work, the examples presented here illustrate the
23diﬀerent eﬀects that may arise. To compare meaningfully, I choose examples where equilibria exist
both under observability and non-observability. In the ﬁrst example, observability is irrelevant.
The wages paid are independent of the age of the ﬁrm. In later examples I show that it is possible
for all ﬁrms to get better oﬀ under one regime or the other. I also present examples where the
preferences of the two types of ﬁrms are opposed.
5.2.1 Observability makes no diﬀerence
Consider a market with the following transition rule. Conditional on a bad outcome, all names
become N-names. Conditional on a good outcome, S-names remain S-names and N-names become
S with probability (1−λ) ∈ (0,1). Consider a “Trust S-Names” equilibrium. When consumers see
an S-name, they know that it is a good ﬁrm, and will pay wS,0 = wS,1 = 1 − ρ. A nascent ﬁrm
with an N-name can be competent or incompetent. Hence, the consumer pays her expected utility
wN,0 =
φ(1 − σS)(1 − ρ)
φ(1 − σS) + 1 − φ
For old ﬁrm with an N-name there are three possibilities. The ﬁrm may be an incompetent one, or
a competent ﬁrm who had an N-name and remained N, or a competent ﬁrm who had an S-name
but ended up with an N-name. Again, the consumer pays her expected utility
wN,1 =
φ(1 − σS)(ρ + λ(1 − ρ)) + φσSρ
1 − φ + φ(1 − σS)(ρ + λ(1 − ρ)) + φσSρ
(1 − ρ)
We can solve for the high-eﬀort sorting equilibrium. It turns out that C-ﬁrms buy S-names with
probability σS =
(1−ρ)(1−λ)
1−λ+λρ . I-ﬁrms use only N-names. The equilibrium price VS is
VS =
wS,0 − wN,0 + λ(1 − ρ)(wS,1 − wN,1)
1 − λ2(1 − ρ)2 .
What happens if we impose the condition that ownership changes cannot be observed? It turns out
that this makes no diﬀerence to the equilibrium in this market. To see why, recall that any ﬁrm
with an S-name must be competent, and so earns a wage wS,0 = wS,1 = 1 − ρ. The wages earned
by ﬁrms with N-names turns out to be
wN,0 = wN,1 =
φρ
φρ + (1 − φ)(1 − λ + λρ)
Since the wages paid are always independent of the age of the ﬁrm, making ownership changes
unobservable does not make any diﬀerence to ﬁrms or consumers.
245.2.2 All ﬁrms prefer one regime
Consider a market where the proportion of C-ﬁrms φ = 0.9 and the cost of eﬀort c = 0.1. The
market has the following transition rule: Conditional on a good outcome, both S and N-names
become S-names. Conditional on a bad outcome, S-names remain S with probability 0.1 and
N-names become S with probability 0.2. (i.e. γ1 = γ3 = 1,γ2 = 0.1,γ4 = 0.2).
Example 1 (All ﬁrms prefer non-observability) Let ρ = 0.1. Under these conditions, under
observability, there exists a “Trust S-names” equilibrium. If name changes were not observable, the
same equilibrium survives, and it can be veriﬁed that all ﬁrms get better oﬀ.
Example 2 (All ﬁrms prefer observability) Let ρ = 0.01. Under these conditions, under ob-
servability, there exists a “Mistrust N-names” equilibrium. If name changes were not observable,
the same equilibrium survives, but now all ﬁrms can be shown to get worse oﬀ.
The net payoﬀ from buying or selling a name is weakly negative. The price of an S-name is higher
in a regime with observability. This implies that under observability, name trading is more costly
for any ﬁrm. A ﬁrm will prefer observability only if the sum of the wages it receives is high enough
to cover the increased cost of name trade.
5.2.3 Diﬀerent ﬁrms prefer diﬀerent regimes
Now suppose the proportion the cost of working hard c = 0.1 and the probability of a bad outcome
conditional on working hard is ρ = 0.01.
Example 3 (C-ﬁrms prefer non-observability, I-ﬁrms prefer observability) Suppose φ =
0.95. Consider the following transition rule. Conditional on a good outcome, an S-name remains
an S-name with probability 1. Conditional on a bad outcome, an S-name remains S with probability
0.2. The corresponding transition probabilities for an N-name are 0.8 and 0.1. Under observability
there exists a “Trust S-names” equilibrium. If ownership changes were not observable, the same
equilibrium survives. C-ﬁrms get better oﬀ while I-ﬁrms lose out. However, together the ﬁrms get
better oﬀ and consequently, consumers get worse oﬀ.
Example 4 (C-ﬁrms prefer observability, I-ﬁrms prefer non-observability) Let φ = 0.5.
Consider the transition rule as above with one diﬀerence. Now conditional on a good outcome, an
S-name remains S with probability 0.95. Under observability there exists a “Mistrust N-names”
25equilibrium. If ownership changes were not observable, the same equilibrium survives. Now, C-
ﬁrms get worse oﬀ while I-ﬁrms get better oﬀ. Together, the ﬁrms get worse oﬀ and so consumers
get better oﬀ.
Observe that, in “Trust S-names equilibria”, observability makes consumers weakly better oﬀ,
while in “Mistrust N-names” equilibria with consumers get worse oﬀ under observability.
6 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the growing literature on ﬁrm reputations and the market for ﬁrm repu-
tations. Earlier work closest in spirit to this paper would include Kreps (1990) and Tadelis (1999,
2002, 2003). In this and related work, the existence of a market for ﬁrm names plays two roles. A
tradeable name provides incentives for short-lived agents to work hard. Also, a ﬁrm name acts as
an assessment of ﬁrm’s ability, and tradeable names allow ﬁrms to buy credibility with consumers.
Tadelis (1999, 2002, 2003) considers a general equilibrium framework where he establishes a link
between the value of the name and price of the ﬁrm’s services. Unlike this work, Tadelis (1999,
2003) considers a model of pure adverse selection. Tadelis (2002) includes moral hazard. One of
the key insights from Tadelis’s work is that non-observability of ownership changes is key to active
name trading in all equilibria.
In the current paper, I depart from the literature by examining whether active trading of ﬁrm
names can exist with observability of ownership changes. I present a model with both adverse
selection and moral hazard and with full observability of name trading. I show that in this envi-
ronment, all high-eﬀort equilibria involve active trading of names. However, we cannot eliminate
the ‘bad’ equilibrium in which all ﬁrms are lazy, consumers mistrust all ﬁrms, ﬁrms earn nothing
and names are not traded. Since the ‘commitment’ type in my model is an incompetent lazy type,
this equilibrium cannot be eliminated.
In a recent paper, Hakenes and Peitz (2007) also ask the question whether ﬁrm names can be
traded when ownership changes are observable. They derive sorting equilibria with observability,
but in a model of pure adverse selection. Further, they do not allow full observability and are
able to obtain active trading only with partial observability. In their set-up, all consumers cannot
observe names of ﬁrms. Firm reputations are observable locally to a subset of consumers.
The other feature that sets this paper apart is the sorting nature of equilibrium. Sorting of
types does not arise in equilibrium in the Tadelis environment. This is a result of two opposing
26eﬀects. On one hand, good ﬁrms value good names because they can work hard and maintain them.
On the other hand, bad ﬁrms value existing good names because they cannot build a reputation for
themselves. When good ﬁrms try to separate themselves by buying good names, the second eﬀect
overwhelms the ﬁrst and bad ﬁrms value good names more than good ﬁrms.
Mailath and Samuelson (2001) also consider a market for ﬁrm reputations in which types cannot
get sorted. They show that names of intermediate value are more likely to be bought by good ﬁrms
and names with extreme reputations are more likely to be bought by bad ﬁrms. Very good names
are more attractive to bad ﬁrms who will gain by depleting the high reputation. Intermediate
names are bought by good ﬁrms, because they can build up the reputation. These names are not
bought by bad ﬁrms, because there is less value to to be depleted. Good ﬁrms ﬁnd it too expensive
to buy a bad name and build up its reputation from scratch.
In this paper, I am able to derive equilibria with sorting of types. I show two types of sorting:
some equilibria where competent ﬁrms can diﬀerentiate themselves by being the only ones buying
valuable names, and other equilibria where incompetent ﬁrms give themselves away by being the
only ﬁrms using worthless names.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I raise two questions central to the literature on ﬁrm names and reputations. First, I
ask whether ﬁrm names can be tradeable assets even when changes in name ownership are observable
to the consumer. Second, I ask if the market for ﬁrm names can act as a sorting device and separate
competent ﬁrms from incompetent ones.
I consider an inﬁnite horizon economy with generations of ﬁrms and consumers interacting in
each period. Firms can be competent or incompetent. Firms choose to enter the market under
diﬀerent names which they buy in a competitive market for names. Changes in name ownership
are fully observable. There are two kinds of names available. Consumers buy a product from the
ﬁrm for which they pay upfront. At the time of purchase, consumers only observe the name of the
ﬁrm. After collecting their payment, ﬁrms provide their services. At the end of the period, each
ﬁrm’s name changes according to a ﬁxed transition rule (potentially random) which determines
the future of a name based on its original name, realized quality of services, and an idiosyncratic
randomization. Before retiring, a ﬁrm can sell its name to a new entrant.
With full observability of name changes, I examine the existence of equilibria in which the
27market for names both makes competent ﬁrms work hard and sorts ﬁrms according to their type.
I deﬁne a class of equilibria called sorting high-eﬀort equilibria (SHE) where at least one type of
ﬁrm has a strict incentive to not use one of the two names, and competent ﬁrms always work hard.
In the main result of the paper, I characterize necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of such sorting high-eﬀort equilibria (SHE). I show that SHE exist provided the cost of eﬀort is low
enough for competent ﬁrms.
I also show that the market for ﬁrm reputations can act as an eﬀective sorting device that
separates competent ﬁrms from incompetent ones. Some names can perfectly signal the type of the
ﬁrm that owns it. Two kinds of sorting may arise in equilibrium. It is possible for competent ﬁrms
to separate themselves by being the only ones buying the valuable successful names. I call these
situations “Trust S-Names equilibria”. In these equilibria, when consumers see a successful name,
they trust it to be a competent ﬁrm and pay the corresponding high price. The second type of
sorting that arises is termed “Mistrust N-Names”. Here, incompetent ﬁrms give themselves away
by being the only ﬁrms using the cheap names. Consumers treat cheap names with mistrust and
pay them corresponding low wages. Competent ﬁrms force this situation to arise by always buying
S-names before entering the market.
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8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, we know that in SHE, competent ﬁrms playing only S-names. This implies that
incompetent ﬁrms must use both S and N-names. The equilibrium conditions are as follows:
Incentive Compatibility for Name Choice
C-ﬁrms strictly prefer using S-names and working hard to using N-names.
−VS + wS − c + δ(1 − ρ)f1VS + δρf2VS > wN − c + δ(1 − ρ)f3VS + δρf4VS (12)
−VS + wS − c + δ(1 − ρ)f1VS + δρf2VS > wN + δf4VS (13)
I-ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between N-names and S-names.
−VS + wS + δf2VS = wN + δf4VS (14)
Incentives for Competent Firms to Work Hard
c < δ(1 − ρ)(f1 − f2)VS (15)
Equilibrium Determination
Market Clearing: φ+(1−φ)µS = φ(1−ρ)f1+φρf2+(1−φ)µSf2+(1−φ)(1−µS)f4
(16)
Wage Determination: wN = 0 and wS > wN
(17)
The eﬀort constraint implies that f1 = 1 and f2 = 0. Further, I claim that f4  = f2. Suppose not,
i.e. f4 = f2 = 0. Then (16) implies µS =
−φρ
1−φ which is not possible. In other words, there would
be a shortage of S-names and the market would not clear. Hence, we have f4 = 1  = f2. This leaves
possible only two transition rules with f3 = 1 or f3 = 0. These are precisely the ones depicted
in the ﬁgure. Consider the ﬁrst transition rule in the ﬁgure (where f3 = 1). Conditions (12)-(16)
reduce to:
µS =











29c < δ(1 − ρ)VS (21)
It can easily be seen that if φ < 1
1+ρ, these conditions yield a non-empty set of sorting equilibria.
Identical conditions arise for the second transition rule. 2
8.2 Richer Market with Non-Random Transitions
Consider a richer market with three names. It turns out that there are only three non-random

























Figure 5: Transitions for SHE in Market with Three States
only under these transition rules. The nature of sorting diﬀers based on the transition rule. With
the ﬁrst two rules, we get “Trust 1-Names” equilibria. In these equilibria, competent ﬁrms buy
all three names, but only competent ﬁrms buy S1-names. Incompetent ﬁrms buy only S2 and
S3-names. The last transition rule yields “Mistrust 3-Names”. Here, competent ﬁrms never enter
with costless S3-names. I-ﬁrms are the only ones using S3 names.
308.3 Proof of Proposition 2














Set the transition probabilities as follows:





δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ) − c(1 − φ + φρ)
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ) + cδφ(1 − φ + φρ)
 
I claim that there exists a “Trust S-Names” equilibrium where C-ﬁrms use S-names with probability
σS =
φ(1−ρ)(1−γ4)+γ4
φ(1+ργ4) and N-names with probability (1 − σS). Competent ﬁrms always choose to





Notice ﬁrst that c <
δ(1−ρ)
2(1−φ)
1−φ+φρ implies that γ4 is well-deﬁned. Further, since γ4 <
φρ
1−φ,
the strategy σS is well-deﬁned. Given the conjectured equilibrium strategies, the wages would be
wS = 1 − ρ and wN =
(1−ρ)[φρ−(1−φ)γ4]
1−φ+φρ−γ4(1−ρ)(1−φ). The incentive constraints for the C-type implies









The conjectured VS also satisﬁes this condition. Here, incentive compatibility of the competent
type implies incentive compatibility for the incompetent type. The market clearing condition is
also satisﬁed with these equilibrium strategies. Finally for the competent type to exert eﬀort we
need to check the following conditions.
c < δ(1 − ρ)VS and c < δ(1 − ρ)(1 − γ4)VS (24)
Clearly, it suﬃces to show that the second constraint holds. We need the following inequality:
c <
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ)(1 − γ4)(1 + ργ4)
[1 + δργ4][ρ + (1 − φ)(1 − ρ)(1 − γ4)
Now, (1 + ργ4)(1 + δφγ4) = 1 + δργ4 + ργ4(1 − δ) + δφγ4(1 + ργ4)
So, (1 + ργ4)(1 + δφγ4) ≥ 1 + δργ4.
Further, (1 − φ + φρ) = ρ + (1 − φ)(1 − ρ) ≥ ρ + (1 − φ)(1 − ρ)(1 − γ4)
=⇒
1
(1 + δφγ4)(1 − φ + φρ)
≤
1 + ργ4
[ρ + (1 − φ)(1 − ρ)(1 − γ4)][1 + δργ4]
.
31This implies that
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ)(1 − γ4)
(1 + δφγ4)(1 − φ + φρ)
≤
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ)(1 − γ4)[1 + ργ4]
[ρ + (1 − φ)(1 − ρ)(1 − γ4)][1 + δργ4]
= δ(1 − ρ)(1 − γ4)VS. (25)
But recall that by deﬁnition of γ4,
γ4 <
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ) − c(1 − φ + φρ)
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ) + cδφ(1 − φ + φρ)
=⇒ c <
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ)(1 − γ4)
(1 + δφγ4)(1 − φ + φρ)













First consider cases where φρ < 1 − φ. This implies that
δ(1−ρ)
2(1−φ)
1−φ+φρ ≤ c <
δ(1−ρ)
2(1−φ)
1−φ+δφρ . Fix the
following transition probabilities:





δφ(1 − ρ)2(1 +
φρ







I claim that that there exists a “Mistrust N-Names” equilibrium where, incompetent ﬁrms use
S-names with probability µS =
(1−φ)γ4−φρ
(1−φ)(1+γ4) and N-names with 1 − µS.Competent ﬁrms choose to
work hard on the equilibrium path. Equilibrium price VS =
φ(1−ρ)(1+γ4)
[1+δγ4][γ4+φ(1−ρ)].
First, we check that the transition probabilities chosen are well-deﬁned.
c <
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ)
1 − φ + δφρ
=⇒ φδ(1 − ρ)
2(1 − φ) − φc(1 − φ + δφρ) > 0





2 − (1 +
δφρ
1 − φ
)(1 − ρ)φc > 0
So the upper bound for γ4 is well-deﬁned. Further,
c <
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ)





δφ(1 − ρ)2(1 +
φρ







So, the interval from which γ4 is chosen is well-deﬁned. Given the conjectured strategies the wages
are wN = 0 and wS =
φ(1−ρ)(1+γ4)




32We can check that VS satisﬁes this condition. Hence, C-ﬁrms strictly prefer S-names to N-names.
Since γ4 >
φρ
1−φ, µS is well-deﬁned, and satisﬁes the market clearing conditions. It only remains
to check that competent ﬁrms have an incentive to work hard on the equilibrium path, i.e. c <
δ(1 − ρ)VS. To prove this, deﬁne a function
ψ(x) =
δφ(1 − ρ)2
γ4 + φ(1 − ρ)
1 + x
1 + δx
Notice that this function is strictly increasing in x. Recall that
γ4 <
δφ(1 − ρ)2(1 +
φρ

















By the monotonicity of ψ(.), if γ4 >
φρ
1−φ then c < ψ(γ4). So, for γ in the speciﬁed range,
c < ψ(γ4) =
δφ(1 − ρ)2(1 + γ4)
(γ4 + φ(1 − ρ))(1 + δγ4)
= δ(1 − ρ)VS.
This proves that we have found a “Mistrust N-Names” equilibrium.
Using a very similar argument as above, we can show that “Mistrust N-Names Equilibria” exist
also in the case when φρ > 1 − φ.
Necessity: Propositions 4 & 5 characterize the types of SHE that exist. We can use these charac-
terizations to show that a necessary condition for SHE to exist is that the cost of hard work is less
than the upper bound.
Consider “Trust S-names” equilibria. Using the characterization in Proposition 4, we derive a
maximal cost of eﬀort for which it is possible to ﬁnd transition rules to support SHE. Finding such
an upper bound reduces to solving the following constrained maximization problem.
max
γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4
δ(1 − ρ)2(1 − φ)(γ3 − γ4)
1 + δ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ1) + δρ(γ4 − γ2)
1 + (1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ1) + ρ(γ4 − γ2)
1 − (1 − ρ)γ1 − ργ2 + (1 − φ)(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ4)
subject to γ1 − γ2 − γ3 + γ4 > 0 (26)
−γ4(1 − φ) + φ(1 − (1 − ρ)γ1 − ργ2) > 0 (27)
γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4 ≥ 0 (28)
γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4 ≤ 1 (29)
The constraints are linear and so the constraint qualiﬁcation condition holds. Further it can be
veriﬁed that constraints (26) and (27) bind. So plugging back γ4 and γ3 and solving the reduced
problem, we ﬁnd that the objective function is maximized at
γ1 = γ3 = 1 γ2 = γ4 =
φρ
1 − φ + φρ
and the maximal value is c
1
max =
δ(1 − φ)(1 − ρ)2
1 − φ + φρ
33Next, consider “Mistrust N-names” equilibria. We will examine two cases:
Case A: Cost of hard work is low enough that it is sequentially rational for a C-ﬁrm to work hard
on and oﬀ the equilibrium path. (i.e., c < min{δ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ4)VS,δ(1 − ρ)(γ1 − γ2)VS}.)
Case B: Cost of work is low enough to sustain hard work only on the equilibrium path.
For equilibria under Case (A), the conditions of Proposition 5 imply
c < δ(1−ρ)(γ3−γ4)
φ(1−ρ)
[φ+(1−φ)µS][1+δ(γ4−γ2)]. To ﬁnd the maximal value of the RHS of this constraint,
we solve the following problem:
max
γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4
δ(1 − ρ)2φ(γ3 − γ4)
1 + δ(γ4 − γ2)
1 + γ4 − γ2
φ(1 − ρ)(γ1 − γ2) + γ4
subject to γ1 − γ2 − γ3 + γ4 > 0 (30)
γ4(1 − φ) − φ(1 − (1 − ρ)γ1 − ργ2) > 0 (31)
1 − γ2 − φ(1 − ρ)(γ1 − γ2) > 0 (32)
γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4 ≥ 0 (33)
γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4 ≤ 1 (34)
Here constraints (30) and (31) bind. Solving the reduced problem we ﬁnd the objective function is
maximized at
γ1 = γ3 = 1 γ2 = γ4 =
φρ
1 − φ + φρ
and the maximal value of c is c2
max =
δ(1 − φ)(1 − ρ)2
1 − φ + φρ
.
Note that in the two maximization problems, the maximum and the maximizers are exactly the
same. For the equilibria covered by Case (B), conditions of Proposition 5 imply
δ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ4)
φ(1−ρ)
[φ+(1−φ)µS][1+δ(γ4−γ2)] ≤ c < δ(1 − ρ)(γ1 − γ2)
φ(1−ρ)
[φ+(1−φ)µS][1+δ(γ4−γ2)]
Again, we solve the constrained maximization problem given by
max
γ1,γ2,γ4
δ(1 − ρ)2φ(γ1 − γ2)
1 + δ(γ4 − γ2)
1 + (γ4 − γ2)
γ4 + φ(1 − ρ)(γ1 − γ2)
subject to γ4(1 − φ) − φ(1 − (1 − ρ)γ1 − ργ2) > 0 (35)
1 − γ2 − φ(1 − ρ)(γ1 − γ2) > 0 (36)
γ1,γ2,γ4 ≥ 0 (37)
γ1,γ2,γ4 ≤ 1 (38)
34It can be veriﬁed that:
1. For φ,ρ such that φ < 1
1+ρ, the objective function is maximized at
γ1 = 1 γ2 = 0 γ4 =
φρ
1 − φ
and the maximal value of c is c
3
max =
δ(1 − φ)(1 − ρ)2
1 − φ + δφρ
.
2. For φ,ρ such that φ > 1
1+ρ, the objective function gets maximized at
γ1 = 1 γ2 = 1 −
1 − φ
φρ
γ4 = 1 and the maximal value of c is c4
max =
δ(1 − φ)(1 − ρ)2
δ(1 − φ) + φρ
.
Inspecting the upper bounds we see that a necessary condition for sorting equilibria to exist is:
c < min
 
δ(1 − φ)(1 − ρ)2
1 − φ + δφρ
,
δ(1 − φ)(1 − ρ)2
δ(1 − φ) + φρ
 
. 2
8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider “Trust S-names” equilibria. The equilbrium conditions are as follows:
Incentive Compatibility for Name Choice
C-ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between N and S-names.
−VS + wS − c + δ(1 − ρ)γ1VS + δργ2VS = wN − c + δ(1 − ρ)γ3VS + δργ4VS
So, VS =
wS − wN
1 + δ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ1) + δρ(γ4 − γ2)
(39)
I ﬁrms must strictly prefer N-names to S-names.
wN + δγ4VS > −VS + wS + δγ2VS =⇒ VS[1 + δ(γ4 − γ2)] > wS − wN (40)
Incentives for Competent Firms to Work Hard
c < δ(1 − ρ)VS(γ1 − γ2) (41)
c < δ(1 − ρ)VS(γ3 − γ4) (42)
Equilibrium Determination
Market Clearing φσS = φσS(1−ρ)γ1+φσSργ2+φ(1−σS)(1−ρ)γ3+φ(1−σS)ργ4+(1−φ)γ4
So, σS =
φ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ4) + γ4
φ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ1) + φρ(γ4 − γ2) + φ
(43)
Wage Determination wS = 1 − ρ > wN =
φ(1 − σS)(1 − ρ)
φ(1 − σS) + 1 − φ
.
35VS > 0 (44)
σS ∈ (0,1) (45)
The incentive constraints of C-ﬁrms and I-ﬁrms together imply that (1) holds. The eﬀort
constraint for a C-ﬁrm with an S-name (41) is equivalent to condition (3). Consider the market
clearing condition (43). Since the eﬀort constraint (42) implies that γ3 > γ4, we know that the
numerator of (43) is positive. So, σS ∈ (0,1), implies that the denominator in (43) must be greater
than the denominator. This implies (2) holds.
Conversely, assume that conditions (1) through (3) in the proposition are satisﬁed. I claim
the following “Trust S-names” high-eﬀort equilibrium exists. Competent ﬁrms buy both S and
N-names. They buy S-names with probability σS =
φ(1−ρ)(γ3−γ4)+γ4
φ(1−ρ)(γ3−γ1)+φρ(γ4−γ2)+φ. Incompetent ﬁrms
buy only N-names. Consequently,wages are wS = 1−ρ and wN =
φ(1−σS)(1−ρ)
φ(1−σS)+1−φ. S-names trade at
a price VS = wS−wN
1+δ(γ4−γ2).
For an equilibrium, we need to check (39) to (45). We know VS ≥ 0. By deﬁnition, (39) and
(43) hold and (3) is equivalent to (42). Since c > 0, (1) and (3) imply (41) holds. (1) also implies
(40) holds. Finally, (1) and (3) imply that the numerator in (43) is positive. Condition (2) implies
that the numerator is strictly lesser than the denominator; so (45) holds. 2
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4. Suppose that for given φ,ρ,γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4,δ and c,
there exists a “Mistrust N-names” equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions are as follows:
Incentive Compatibility for Name Choice
C-ﬁrms strictly prefer an S-name to an N-name.
−VS + wS − c + δ(1 − ρ)γ1VS + δργ2VS > wN − c + δ(1 − ρ)γ3VS + δργ4VS
VS <
wS − wN
1 + δ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ1) + δρ(γ4 − γ2)
(46)
Further, − VS + wS − c + δ(1 − ρ)γ1VS + δργ2VS > wN + δγ4VS
So, VS(1 + δγ4 − δ(1 − ρ)γ1 − δργ2) < wS − wN − c (47)
I-ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between N-names and S-names.
VS[1 + δ(γ4 − γ2)] = wS − wN (48)
36Incentives for Competent Firms to Work Hard
c < δ(1 − ρ)VS(γ1 − γ2) (49)
Equilibrium Determination
Market Clearing =⇒ µS =
φ(1 − ρ)γ1 + φργ2 + (1 − φ)γ4 − φ
(1 − φ)(1 + γ4 − γ2)
(50)
Wage Determination wN = 0 < wS =
φ(1 − ρ)
φ + (1 − φ)µS
.
VS > 0 and (51)
µS ∈ (0,1) (52)
Clearly, we need µS ∈ (0,1). This implies that the second inequality in Conditions 1 and 2 hold.
(49) is equivalent to Condition 3. Finally, the incentive constraints (46) and (48) together imply
that the ﬁrst inequality in Condition 1 holds. This proves the necessary conditions.
Conversely, suppose that there for given φ,ρ,γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4,δ and c, the conditions of the proposi-
tion are satisﬁed. I claim that there exists a “Mistrust N-names” equilibrium in which incompetent
ﬁrms buy S-names with probability µS given by (50) and where the price of an S-name, VS is given
by (48). To verify that this is an equilibrium, we need to check for conditions (46) through (52).
Conditions (48) through (51) are trivially satisﬁed.
γ3 − γ1 < γ4 − γ2 =⇒ 1 + δ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ1) + δρ(γ4 − γ2) < 1 + δ(γ4 − γ2)
=⇒ VS[1 + δ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ1) + δρ(γ4 − γ2)] < VS[1 + δ(γ4 − γ2)]
=⇒ (46) is satisﬁed.
(A4) and (46) imply that the other IC of the C-type (47) is also satisﬁed. Condition (3) and
(49) are equivalent. Conditions (1) and (2) ensure that (52) holds. It remains to be shown that the
second incentive constraint for the C-type (47) also holds. Consider two cases:
Case(i) c < δ(1 − ρ)(γ3 − γ4)
φ(1−ρ)
[φ+(1−φ)µS][1+δ(γ4−γ2)]: c is low enough for C-ﬁrms to work hard
in every state. (47) is implied by the ﬁrst IC constraint of the C-type and we are done.
Case (ii) c ≥ δ(1− ρ)(γ3 −γ4)
φ(1−ρ)
[φ+(1−φ)µS][1+δ(γ4−γ2)]: Here, a C-ﬁrm works hard only if it buys
an S-name. Then, the IC of I-type and (3) imply (47) holds. This proves suﬃciency. 2
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